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Abstract 
 
The aim of the present contribution is to examine the policy making role of Greek ministerial 
advisers. Given the lack of prior empirical work on the issue, the objective is to add the empirical 
examination of a new case in the literature. This is achieved by locating the Greek ministerial 
cabinet adviser phenomenon within the ministerial cabinet tradition, as well as putting forward a 
classification using typologies according to policy roles, policy advice activities based on the nature 
and dimension of advice, content of advice and finally the policy cycle. The contribution in hand 
was designed as a single country, small N, comparative study. Data was collected for the 2010 – 
2013 period, using a mixed methods approach: a questionnaire survey on 28 advisers, semi-
structured interviews with two Ministers and four senior civil servants, and document analysis. The 
argument put forward in the study is that Greek ministerial advisers form a case of agents active in a 
politicized advisory system, as found in ministerial cabinets. Based on the evidence in hand Greek 
ministerial advisers have been classified as coordinators, being predominantly generalists, with a 
main focus on management of the government program, providing “hot”, pure political and policy 
process advice, as well as short term crisis and fire-fighting advice. Greek ministerial advisers 
appear to be political without being overtly partisan. They are primarily managers focusing on 
policy steering rather than experts focusing on technical policy making. Moreover, they provide for 
vertical, within the Ministry’s departments, coordination, resorting to horizontal coordination 
mainly with advisers at other Ministries. Finally, they deal predominantly with the front end of 
policymaking, enjoying a high leverage in agenda setting and policy formulation. Greek ministerial 
advisers, though, are also highly active in the back end of the policy cycle in particular 
implementation and evaluation, reflecting both their project-management coordinator role, as well 
as the central role ministerial cabinets exercise in policy making. 
 
Keywords: political advisers, policy advisers, ministerial cabinet systems, policy advisory systems 
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Introduction 
 
Political advisers, the so called third party in political-administrative relations, are nowadays 
“prominent actors in top political positions” (Schreurs et al 2010, p. 19). Not only are they 
“engaged in fulfilling the responsibilities of the political executive”, they also “enjoy a share in the 
policy process” (Schreurs 2010, p. 19). Indeed they are central players in policy advice giving 
(Craft 2011, p. 9). There are good reasons why this is happening. Ministers, combining various 
competences and having a big work load, lack time to perform every activity by themselves and 
therefore need a person they can trust to support them and even replace them at times 
(Vancoppenolle 2011, p. 6). More importantly, ministerial advisers may address gaps in policy 
capabilities and capacity (Connaughton 2010, p. 349, Eichbaum and Shaw 2010, p. 21) or 
coordinate outside sources of advice in more pluralized, horizontal policy advice landscapes (Craft 
and Howlett 2012, p. 84, 88). As such, advisers might be considered a variable in the equation of 
responsive government and good governance (Eichbaum and Shaw 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, the advent of political advisers in the central political stage has not been without 
problems. Since the beginning of the 21st century, political advisers in OECD countries have 
increasingly come under the spotlight of the media and the public’s attention. Despite being an 
embedded and overall legitimate actor of public life since the late ‘70s, their role has been largely 
controversial (Connaughton 2010, p. 349). Concerns about the “people who live in the dark” have 
primarily been raised due to their growing numbers, their lack of accountability, the way they 
operate (spin-doctoring), their policy influence at times associated with “responsive incompetence”, 
as well as the opacity of their status (Blick, 2004, p. 7–9, Eichbaum and Shaw 2010, p. 20, OECD 
2011, p. 1).  
 
In Greece too, public concern over the role of advisers has not been limited. Media reporting on the 
growing numbers and costs of advisers has been in the front line, especially since the outbreak of 
the debt crisis in 2009. There are indeed risks to be managed. These risks, among others, relate to 
budgetary costs and democratic accountability, but also to the autonomy of the civil service and the 
responsiveness of government (Eichbaum & Shaw 2010, p. 9). According to the literature, advisers 
can either be a threat or an opportunity for effective government and good governance 
(Connaughton 2010, p. 350). In this sense, the study of political advisers becomes of importance in 
any democratic polity.  
 
Not surprisingly, a great amount of the recent academic literature has been dedicated to the 
consequences of advisers’ activities on accountability (OECD 2010, 2011). The current study is not 
interested in this aspect, important as this might be. The aim of the present contribution is to 
examine the nature and roles of Greek ministerial advisers, particularly in the policy making 
process. Given the absence of any previous empirical work on Greek ministerial advisers, our 
overall objective is to add the empirical examination of a new case in the literature.  
 
We designed our study as a single-country, small N, comparative study. It is comparative because it 
uses concepts and typologies applicable to other countries and seeks to make larger inferences as to 
the policy making activities of ministerial advisers in ministerial cabinet systems (Landman 2003, 
p.34). As such, single country studies like the present in hand may be “considered as part of the 
larger comparative public administration research enterprise” (Brans 2003, p. 425). Given its 
classificatory nature, the present contribution does not put forward an explanatory hypothesis. On 
the contrary, our hypothesis here is that Greek ministerial advisers form a case of agents active in a 
politicized advisory system, as found in ministerial cabinets. In view of this, data have been 
collected using a mixed methods approach, aiming to take as many views on the phenomenon under 
investigation as possible. First, we surveyed a sample of 28 ministerial advisers in the Ministry for 
Development in the period 2010-2013. Then, we interviewed two Ministers for Development and 
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four senior civil servants. We also used document analysis in order to describe the legal framework 
on Greek ministerial cabinets and advisers. 
 
We present our material as follows. First, provide an overview of the literature on Greek ministerial 
advisers in order to show the depth and width of the empirical gap that needs to be covered. Second, 
we present our research design. This includes the aims and objectives of the present study, the 
theoretical framework, especially the typologies we will be using, our choice of sample and the 
methods for collecting our data. Limitations and problems of the current research will also be 
presented. Third, we quickly provide a short account of the wider aspects of the Greek ministerial 
adviser phenomenon in comparison to other OECD countries, while we also sketch the politico-
administrative context in which Greek ministerial advisers operate. Fourth, we present a descriptive 
profile of the Greek ministerial adviser based on our sample of advisers. Fourth, we present the 
main findings of our survey and construct our typologies. Finally, we conclude with revisiting our 
research question and providing an overview, as well as a discussion of our findings, also providing 
leads for future research. 
 
1. Ministerial advisers in Greece: what do we know? 
 
Review of the existing literature on Greek ministerial advisers, shows that the particular field of 
study has been seriously under-researched. Despite public concern over their actions, little attention 
has been paid thus far as to the roles, background, expertise and policy activities these actors 
perform as a collective. The recent OECD (2011) survey on ministerial advisers did not include 
Greece in the sample of 27 countries under examination. What we know on Greek political 
advisers, we learn it primarily from studies on the transformation of the top civil service (Tsekos 
1986), the evolution of political-administrative relations (Sotiropoulos 1996, 1999, 2004, 2007, 
Spanou 2001, 2008), and to a lesser extent from studies on the roles of experts in various specific 
policy fields (Ladi 2005, 2007). According to the literature: 
 
 Ministerial advisers were institutionalized for the first time in 1976 (Tsekos 1986, p. 188-
189) 
 There is a growing number of political advisers since 1981 after the abolition of the posts of 
Director Generals (Law 1232/1982), under Law 1320/1983, and later under the 
reorganization of the Political Offices of the Minister to Cabinets in 1985 (Tsekos 1986, 
Sotiropoulos 1999, 2007, Spanou 2001). 
 Ministerial cabinets in Greece are structured along French lines (Sotiropoulos 1999, p. 15). 
 After a confrontational start between politicians and top bureaucrats over ministerial 
advisers’ role in the early eighties, advisers are now widely considered as the third party of 
what Spanou (2001, p. 109-110) has coined as a “symbiotic” politico-administrative 
relationship. That is a mutually beneficial exchange between politicians and top bureaucrats, 
where top civil servants give political submission in return for initiated reforms.  
 Politicians act as policy initiators and consequently have a great need for professional 
experts (Sotiropoulos 2007, p. 33). Thus they rely on their advisers as well as on other 
temporary political staff (Sotiropoulos 2007, p. 32). 
 Senior civil servants are “unlikely to be valued sources of political and public policy advice” 
(Page, Wright 2007, p. 233). Under normal “Weberian” conditions the politician would find 
himself in the position of the “dilettante” who stands opposite the “expert”. In the case of 
Greece the situation is reversed. Policy wise, top bureaucrats remain amateurs in anything 
but legal advice giving (Sotiropoulos 2007, p. 32-33).  
 Thus top bureaucrats are excluded from the formulation of most reforms, which require long 
term strategic planning (Sotiropoulos 2007, p. 32). 
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 However, as Spanou (2008, p. 163) informs us, ministerial cabinets in Greece have neither 
the expertise nor the policy capacity of the French “Cabinets Ministériels”. Nevertheless, 
they tend to play an important role in policy making, because they are mostly “staffed by 
persons that enjoy the minister’s political and personal trust” (Spanou 2008, p. 163) 
 
 
2. Research design: theory and methods 
 
Given the absence of any prior empirical work on Greek ministerial advisers and in view of the 
stated aims and objectives of the present study we formed the following research question: what is 
the nature and role, particularly the policy making role, of the Greek ministerial adviser? We 
answer the question by putting forward a classification of the Greek ministerial adviser’s roles and 
activities in policy making. The present paper is part of a larger research project, which ran from 
December 2012 to April 2013 and was recently submitted as a Master Thesis on Greek ministerial 
advisers for the needs of the MEPP program at KU Leuven. The project was driven by the above 
mentioned fundamental research question, but also by the following research sub-questions:  
 
a) What is the history and evolution of the adviser phenomenon in Greece?  
b) What is the statutory framework for Greek ministerial advisers? 
c) How do Greek ministerial advisers compare to their colleagues in OECD countries and countries 
with ministerial cabinet systems in relation to wider aspects beyond the legal framework?   
d) What is the descriptive profile (age, gender, education, expertise) of the Greek ministerial 
adviser? 
e) How can Greek ministerial advisers policy making work be assessed according to existing 
typologies? 
 
2.1 Theory  
 
In order to escape the fallacy of a non-comparative, “atheoretical”, “interpretative” or 
“configurative-idiographic” study the present paper relies on the use of concepts and typologies 
applicable to other countries (Landman 2003, p. 34). Classification is a “necessary component of 
systematic comparison”, though of a higher level than contextual description since “it seeks to 
group many separate descriptive entities into simpler categories” (Landman 2003, p. 4). We classify 
advisers’ policy making involvement according to existing typologies by:  
 
a) “Policy advisory roles”. Here we use Conaughton’s (2010) four type classification model, 
according to which an adviser may be classified as expert, partisan, coordinator or minder. 
 
b) “Dimension and nature of advice”. Here we use Craft’s (2011) four type classification model of 
policy advice giving activities, according to which advisers may be classified as belonging to the 
administrative/horizontal type I, the partisan/horizontal type II, the administrative/vertical type III 
and the partisan vertical  type IV. Despite being an early attempt at classification the typology is 
useful in that it gives us the benefit of looking into the degree of horizontality of the dimension of 
advisers’ policy activities.  
 
c) “Content of advice”. Here we use Craft and Howlett’s (2012) four type classification model, 
according to which an adviser may be seen as offering pure political and policy process advice, 
medium to long term policy steering advice, short term crisis and fire-fighting advice, evidence 
based policy making 
 
d) “Policy cycle stage”. A further way to achieve a more systematic interpretation of ministerial 
advisers’ policy advice activity is to link their activities to the discrete stages of the policy cycle. In 
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this way we can locate the stages where political advisers appear to be most active. For the present 
study we will use the five stages of the policy cycle presented by Howlett, Ramesh and Perl 
(Howlett et al 2009): a) agenda setting where problems are recognized, b) policy formulation where 
alternative solutions and proposals are formed, c) decision making where solutions are chose, d) 
policy implementation where solutions are put into effect, e) policy evaluation where results are 
been monitored. 
 
2.2 Methods   
 
We designed the present study as a single-country, small N, comparative study. It is comparative 
because it uses concepts and typologies applicable to other countries and seeks to make larger 
inferences as to the policy making activities of ministerial advisers in ministerial cabinet systems 
(Landman 2003, p.34). Having chosen the road of classification, the study in hand does not frame 
an explanation driven hypothesis. We rather hypothesize that Greek ministerial advisers form a case 
of agents active in a politicized advisory system as found in ministerial cabinets.  
 
Our case here is Greece and the period under investigation 2010 to 2013. Data were drawn from 
three sources. First, we ran a 28-item survey with both forced-choice and open-ended questions. 
The questionnaire was distributed in the beginning of February 2013 to advisers in two ministerial 
cabinets, under two different successive Ministers in the Greek Ministry for Development in the 
period 2010 to 2013. In the first cabinet the questionnaire was distributed directly to 44 advisers. In 
the second cabinet, the questionnaire was distributed via the cabinet’s chief of staff. We were never 
informed about the exact number of advisers that have received the questionnaire. Overall, we 
received completed questionnaires from 28 advisers (n = 28). From those, 23 came from the first 
ministerial cabinet, while 5 came from the second one. With 23 responses out of 44 distributed 
questionnaires, the response rate for the former is 52%. With only 5 responses from the latter, the 
response rate is very low. We estimate it to be below 10% of the total number of the Cabinet’s 
advisers at the time. This, of course, is a result not to have been expected at such a scale and poses a 
limitation to our research. From the sample of 28 advisers 17 are no longer working as advisers, 
while 11 are currently working in various ministerial cabinets from the Ministry for Development to 
the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. As a second source of collecting data 
and in order to take as many perspectives as possible on the phenomenon under investigation, we 
conducted six semi-structured interviews with members of the two groups with whom advisers 
work most closely: two ministers and four senior civil servants at the level of Director General and 
Director. The interviews took place in early February 2013 in Athens, Greece. Third, data on the 
Greek statutory framework were collected using document analysis and secondary analyses 
presented in the literature and reports like the recent OECD (2011) study on ministerial advisers. 
 
Finally, we need to stress at this point that the study suffers from certain limitations. The first and 
most important one, already mentioned above, is a very low rate of return in responses from 
advisers in one of the two ministerial cabinets of our sample. It may be argued that this may hinder 
the generalisability of our findings. Knowing from the start that we had limited time resources, 
which would constrain us from distributing the questionnaire to more advisers in case of low 
response problems, we have tried to predict for such risks in advance. The pre-emptive measures we 
took are the following. First, we made sure we took semi-structured interviews from both Ministers 
and senior civil servants in order to triangulate our data. Second, except for reasons of easy access, 
we have chosen the Ministry for Development, because its ministerial cabinet comprises a larger 
than average number of advisers, having merged the Cabinets of two and later three previously 
independent Ministries. Looking at the Ministry for Development we focus, single-handedly, on a 
large enough sample of advisers from a series of previously independent civilian, non-special corps 
organised Greek Ministries and thus gain in generalisability in terms of the population we want to 
generalise to. Finally, a second problem in the study at hand is the moving sand conditions that the 
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debt crisis in Greece is creating. From October 2009 to June 2012 there have been five different 
Ministers for Development and four different governments. From those governments, one was 
technocratic and one care taker. From the ministers, one minister was a technocrat. In order to 
account for this problem we have chosen two political ministers with a significant political history 
whose appointment was not the result of pre-electoral emergency.  
 
 
3. Wider aspects of the Greek ministerial adviser phenomenon 
 
In the present section we offer a brief but compact comparison of the phenomenon of Greek 
ministerial advisers and in particular its common trends with other OECD countries. In addition, we 
sketch the politico-administrative context in which Greek advisers operate. The ministerial cabinet 
system is argued to give rise to certain trends that are different in comparison to other systems and 
politico-administrative traditions.     
 
3.1 Comparing Greek ministerial advisers to their counterparts in the OECD: common trends 
 
Comparison of our data on Greek ministerial advisers to OECD data (2011) on the phenomenon of 
advisers in other OECD countries shows that there exist certain common fundamental trends across 
the board. As in the OECD 27 country sample, in Greece too:  
 
a) Advisers’ appointment is at the sole discretion of the Minister who according to our interviews 
selects advisers personally regarding “trust and personal chemistry” as an essential criterion. Even 
more importantly though the Minister wants advisers to “understand politics as the art of the 
feasible”, if needed have “awareness and knowledge of a specific policy portfolio in certain fields” 
as well as “ability to be fast and efficient learners”. 
 
b) Advisers’ job description is not defined in legislation. It is the Minister who assigns job 
descriptions based on the ministry’s competencies, according to departmental (i.e. “oversight of the 
general secretariat of industry”), functional (i.e. “media and communications”), policy portfolio (i.e. 
“export policy”, “digital convergence”) or policy project (i.e. “acceleration of NSRF absorption 
rates”) based criteria or a combination of all these.   
 
c) The employment framework (pay scale, grade) is streamlined to civil service rules. In the Greek 
case this is done via Presidential Decree 63/2005. 
 
d) Ministers appear to value the fact that advisers act as accelerators of the government machine: 
According to Minister A:  
 
“[The adviser] speeds up the policy process, facilitating its implementation… Essentially he acts as 
a multiplier and an accelerator, fast and in a wide range of areas… The adviser is the timing belt, 
the gear that connects the crankshaft to the camshaft, making the government machine work on 
time”. [Own translation] 
 
At the same time, as with 47% of the respondents in the OECD country sample, senior civil 
servants in Greece appear to consider the facilitation of communication between the Minister and 
public servants as important. According to respondent 3, a senior civil servant: 
 
“The adviser is the intermediary between the Minister and the public services. The Minister gives 
directions and the adviser communicates them to the departments” [Own translation] 
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e) The working boundaries with the civil service are blurred. In Greece, tensions between senior 
civil servants and politicians over the role of advisers in the ‘80s resulted to top civil servants 
resorting to the supreme administrative court of Greece, the Council of State (Symvoulio tis 
Epikrateias), in order keep political advisers at bay (Sotiropoulos 2007, p. 21). The court ruled that 
advisers can play no role in state executive functions (Council of State 1997). Legislation too makes 
it explicitly clear that advisers shall not have executive powers and they cannot command the 
administration. Nevertheless, the working boundaries between the actors though are still defined in 
an ad hoc way. Advisers might not have the right to sign documents or letters on behalf of 
ministers, but they still may de facto issue instructions to civil servants or manage them especially 
in view of the timely completion of a project. Indeed, 32.1% of the respondents in our sample of 
advisers have stated to be managing civil servants as their primary job function. 
 
f) Finally, advisers in Greece too are considered a source of public concern (spin doctors, people 
who live in the dark). 
 
3.2 The ministerial cabinet system: fundamental differences 
 
In Greece, like in France, Italy, Belgium where “ministerial cabinets were re-invented” despite the 
Copernicus reform, and the European Commission, ministerial advisers’ belong to ministerial 
cabinets (Brans and Steen 2007, p. 77-78, James 2007). This is different to the Westminster 
tradition, where advisers work alongside a neutral civil service (UK, Australia, New Zealand), or to 
systems where advisers work alongside a civil service whose top tier is also made up of political 
appointees like in Spain or the Slovak Republic (OECD 2011, p. 23). As such, the ministerial 
adviser phenomenon in Greece projects a set of distinct trends, found specifically in ministerial 
cabinet systems (James 2007). 
 
First, the status, qualifications, employment framework and wider roles of advisers are strictly 
defined into law. In the case of Greece, it is Presidential Decree 63/2005 on the “Codification of 
Legislation concerning the Organisation of Government and Governmental Bodies”, which codifies 
in one single text all provisions regarding the organisation (size and synthesis), personnel and 
functions of the Political Offices (Cabinets) of the Prime Minister, the Vice- President of the 
Government, the Ministers and alternate Ministers, the Deputy Ministers as well as the offices of 
the Secretary Generals. The designation special adviser, coined in Presidential Decree 63/2005, 
refers to a specific category of ministerial cabinet staff that unlike most of their colleagues is 
appointed to a special position, gets paid at the highest possible pay scale and is directly liable to 
the Minister. In reality, though, apart from special advisers, members of the ministerial cabinet may 
also be considered advisers independently of their formal employment status and legal position title, 
so long as they perform “advisory” and not “administrative support” duties. This is confirmed by 
our research findings whereby only (17.8%) of our sample of ministerial advisers have the status of 
special advisers, (10.7%) that of special associate, while the majority (21.4%) are fixed-termers and 
seconded civil servants (25%). This is a crucial point to keep in mind before moving further down 
the path of our analysis. It is not the formal employment status or the title that makes the adviser in 
Greece, but rather the role assigned to every cabinet staff by the Minister.   
 
Second, ministerial advisers in Greece are numerous. In respect to size, the Political Office of the 
Minister may range from a minimum size of 24 Cabinet staff to an open number according to the 
Minister’s needs. This may at times even approach the number of 100 staff. This is comparable to 
Belgium, where in some ministerial cabinets before the Copernicus reform advisers reached up to 
100 members. Slightly smaller, but equally big in size are cabinets in France. According to 
Göransson (2008, p. 17) they comprise some 40 to 50 members. James (2007, p. 16) talks about 20 
to 30 members per minister and 10 to 20 for a deputy minister, reaching in total 700 members in 
2007. The total number for Greece in 2012 was estimated at 1200 (Karkatsoulis 2012, p. 9). 
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Third, like in most ministerial cabinet systems, the use of advisers is linked to an increased need for 
political control, as well as a perception of civil service inadequacy. According to one of the two 
interviewed Ministers “advisers form a mini-public administration doing the job that the normal 
public administration cannot do”. Political control and perceptions of inadequacy are in turn linked 
to the historical path that brings us to the institutionalisation of the ministerial cabinet system in the 
first place. In the case of Greece the change of government in 1981 brought along an explosion in 
the numbers of advisers. PASOK, a then new mass political party of the left, “saw the state 
apparatus as an impediment” to its program for democratization, democratic modernisation and 
expansion of the welfare state (Sotiropoulos 2007, p. 21). In order to circumscribe the 
administrative hierarchy and establish political control over what was perceived as a hostile to its 
aspirations senior civil service, the new government abolished the top administrative posts of 
Director Generals and increased the number of advisers to 218 (Tsekos 1986, p. 189). In 1985, Law 
1558/1985 reorganized political staffs and established ministerial cabinets along French lines 
(Sotiropoulos 1999, p. 15). In Belgium cabinets go back to the 1840s at the time of Ministers’ 
emancipation from monarchical influence (Brans and Steen 2007, p. 65). Along with government 
expansion, grew the need of Ministers for political control. Given the discontinuity produced by the 
Belgian “partitocracy” the civil service was in no position to play such role (Brans and Steen 2007, 
p. 66).  
 
Fourth, as in most ministerial cabinet systems, the working boundaries between advisers and civil 
servants are not only blurred, but politicisation also runs high. This in turn results to increased 
politico-administrative friction. Ministerial advisers in Greece, by law, are not allowed to issue 
orders to civil servants (PD 63/2005). However, our research has found that Greek ministerial 
advisers de facto issue instructions to civil servants or manage them especially in view of the timely 
completion of a project. Indeed, 32.1% of the respondents in our sample of advisers have claimed to 
be managing civil servants as their primary job function. Moreover, interviews with senior civil 
servants have shown, that Greek ministerial advisers’ beneficial role is also associated with 
important limitations. Advisers’ role has come up as “controversial and questionable”, having 
“important side effects” and pointing at “negative consequences from advisers’ wrong advice”. In 
addition, they are perceived as gatekeepers of the ministerial office, thus preventing direct access to 
the minister. Finally, instead of shielding senior civil servants from political involvement, they are 
perceived as increasing politicisation (OECD 2011, p.19-20). Referring to the situation in the ‘80s 
and to a certain extent today, a senior civil servant referred to the alienation of the public 
administration, while stating that “there were ministerial advisers overarching even the deputy 
ministers, simply because they were coming from the minister…” 
 
Finally, as is the case with all ministerial cabinet systems, ministerial cabinets in Greece have a 
central role in the “design, formulation, implementation and evaluation of public policy” (James 
2007, p. 17). This is also the case in France and Belgium, but also Spain is seen as moving along 
this path (James 2007, p. 17, p. 51-64). Moreover, as with most ministerial cabinet systems, 
decision-making in Greece too “is pulled upwards”, towards the cabinet, pushing the rest of the 
ministry and it’s departments into more technical roles, mainly execution of decisions taken at the 
top (James 2007, p. 17). But who are the advisers and what do they do in terms of policy making?  
 
 
4. Who are the advisers, what skills should they possess and why they do it? 
 
In the present section we are going to obtain a descriptive profile of the Greek ministerial adviser in 
view of the absence of any prior empirical work. Who are they? What is their background? What is 
their previous work experience? Have they had advisory work experience before? What skills 
should an adviser possess according to them? Finally, why do they do this job? Data has been 
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selected on the basis of a questionnaire on 28 advisers working in the Minister’s Cabinet at the 
Ministry for Development in the period 2010 - 2013. Our material will be presented according to: 
general profile, previous work experience and skills, skills an adviser should possess, and reasons 
for doing this job.  
 
4.1 General profile: gender, age, education 
 
In respect to gender the vast majority of the advisers in our sample are men (67.8%), as opposed to 
female (32.1%). This is similar to what Connaughton (2011, p. 354) and Eichbaum and Shaw 
(2007, p. 97) found for advisers in Ireland and New Zealand respectively. In respect to age more 
than half of the advisers in our sample are in their thirties (57.1%), followed by 17.8% in their 
forties, 14.2% in their twenties, 7.1% in their fifties, 3.57% in their sixties and none above 65. The 
dominant age in the ministerial cabinet is 30 to 34 (35.7%). In terms of education level the highest 
qualification among the advisers who responded has a Doctorate (10.7%), whereas 67.8% of 
advisers surveyed have a Masters degree and 21.4% a Bachelors. In terms of field of education, 
lawyers and political scientists come first with 21.4% and 17.8% respectively, while 3.57% have 
both a legal and political science background. Advisers whose field of education is economics 
follow suit with 10.7%, same as those with a communication and media education background. If to 
the economists we add the 3.57% with a business educational background then advisers with a 
broad economic educational background appear to make up 14.27%, still an odd third place for a 
productive Ministry, like the Ministry for Development under examination. Finally, for a ministerial 
cabinet system built on French lines, it may be argued that it is rather odd that only one adviser of 
our sample was a graduate of the National School for Public Administration the Greek equivalent to 
ENA.  
 
4.2 Previous work experience  
The Greek ministerial advisers surveyed were drawn from a variety of professional backgrounds. 
Just before their recruitment to the ministerial cabinet, 25% stated that they have already been 
working as political advisers. Equally large is the number of professionals from the media, 
communication, public relations and journalism, making all together 24.9% with 10.7% coming 
from journalism and 14.2% from the communications industry. Lawyers and legal experts along 
with private sector managers make up the next two biggest professional categories with 14.2% each, 
while researchers and people working in academia the fifth with 7.1%. As far as the actual former 
sector of employment is concerned, there, we see that 50% was employed in the public sector as 
opposed to 35.7% in the private and 14.3% in the third sectors respectively. Given that only a 
quarter of the advisers in our sample are seconded public servants, this high previous public sector 
employment begs for an explanation. We assume that the answer here is that some of the sample’s 
advisers have been working as advisers to the previous Minister for Development and retained their 
posts with the next one, coming in after a government reshuffling, while some of them were already 
working as advisers at another Ministry and were transferred along to the new one with their 
Minister.  
Apart from asking them to state their previous to the ministerial cabinet job, we also asked advisers 
to state whether they have had any advisory or private consulting experience at any time during the 
past. Based on their responses half of them (50%) appeared to have done consulting work in private 
business, and a little less than half (46.4%) appeared to have had ministerial cabinet advisory 
experience. These numbers are followed by 32.1% with advisory experience in a Think Tank and 
28.57% in an NGO. 7.1% advisers appeared to have had no past advisory experience. Among the 
response coded as other (14.28%) answers included advisory work experience in the EU, the UN, a 
law office and the public sector of another country. 
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Table 1: Advisory past experience by organisation (%), n = 28 
Organisation: No + (%) 
Think Tank 9 (32.1%) 
University 5 (17.85%) 
Governmental organisation 6 (21.4%) 
Ministerial cabinet 13 (46.4%) 
Political Party 3 (10.7%) 
Office of an MP 8 (28.57%) 
Office of an MEP 1 (3.57%) 
NGO  8 (28.57%) 
Private Business  14 (50%) 
Other 4 (14.28%) 
No advisory experience 2 (7.1%) 
 
4.3 Skills an adviser should possess 
In the present study we also asked advisers to state what kind of skills and traits they thought an 
adviser should possess in order to perform their job properly. Applied politics and policy skills 
came up as the most important attributes an adviser must possess. On one hand, this reflects either 
the importance of understanding processes, like the workings of executive government, stated as 
most important by 39.2%, or skills like policy negotiation (28.57%). On the other hand, it reflects 
the importance of having technical skills relating to the actual design and implementation of public 
policy. Here, policy research and analysis as well as policy evaluation come first with 32.1% each, 
while generic policy expertise follows with 28.57%. These results are consisted with the overall 
picture presented by both Connaughton (2011, p. 355) and Eichbaum and Shaw (2007, p. 101-102) 
for advisers in Ireland and New Zealand respectively. We need to be careful with those results 
though. As Ministers point to civil service inadequacies but are careful not to talk about mistrusting 
the administration, advisers too might be framing their answers in a socially desirable way. In the 
case of the advisers of our sample it may be argued that one very important factor works against the 
social desirability hypothesis. In Greece, partisan politics in the sense of elections and maintaining 
support for the Minister’s constituency is a function primarily outsourced to the Political Office of 
the Minister as Member of Parliament. This office is staffed both under a different statutory 
framework and follows different political needs. The merits valued by politicians and respectively 
the traits needed on behalf of this political advisory personnel to perform the job properly differ in 
comparison to the needs of the cabinet. To illustrate this point a bit further, it is often the case that 
the two offices antagonize each other, at times even exchanging criticisms for being apolitical 
technocrats or over-politicised party partisans respectively. Of course, how much of a technocrat the 
Greek ministerial adviser really is, we will have the opportunity to discover in the next section. 
Getting back on the question on skills and traits an adviser ideally should possess, we observe that 
communication and media do not feature as much either, since only 17.8% of advisers consider 
them as most important. Finally, among responses coded as “other” (28.57%) it is interesting to 
note that the need for specialisation and expertise came up half of the times as important, thus 
double stressing the need Greek ministerial advisers seem to give to applied policy skills. Beyond 
this, it is interesting also to note that “project management” also came up as a necessary skill 
advisers must possess.     
Table 2 Skills and traits an adviser should possess (%), n = 28 
Skills/Traits Not at all 
important 
 
Least 
Important 
Fairly 
important 
 
Most 
important 
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Network with 
Government Departments  
1 (3.57%) 10 (35.7%) 15 (53.57%) 2 (7.1%) 
Policy expertise  0 (0%) 3 (10.7%) 17 (60.7%) 8 (28.57%) 
Policy negotiation  2 (7.1%) 1 (3.57%) 17 (60.7%) 8 (28.57%) 
Communications/media  0 (0%) 11 (39.2%) 11 (39.2%) 5 (17.8%) 
Same ideology/political 
preferences as minister 
2 (7.1%) 14 (50%) 11 (39.2%) 1 (3.57%) 
Pre-existing links with the 
public service 
4 (14.2%) 14 (50%) 7 (25%) 3 (10.7%) 
Understanding the 
processes of 
executive government 
1 (3.57%) 0 (0%) 16 (57.1%) 11 (39.2%) 
Policy evaluation skills  1 (3.57%) 1 (3.57%) 15 (53.57%) 9 (32.1%) 
Membership of the same 
political 
party as the minister 
12 (42.8%) 10 (35.7%) 6 (21.4%) 0 (0%) 
Policy research & 
analysis  
2 (7.1%) 2 (7.1%) 15 (53.57%) 9 (32.1%) 
Pre-existing links with 
interest groups 
9 (32.1%) 15 (53.57%) 4 (14.2%) 1 (3.57%) 
Speech writing 4 (14.2%) 15 (53.57%) 8 (28.57%) 0 (0%) 
Other (please define)   2 (7.1%) 
(1) Team Spirit 
(2)Specialisation 
6 (21.4%) 
(2) Project mgt 
(2) 
Effectiveness  
(1) Faith, trust, 
sincerity, 
confidentiality  
(1) 
Specialisation 
 
4.4 Why do they do it? 
 
Ministerial advisers in Greece appear to display similar reasons with those in other countries for 
undertaking their role. 89.2% have responded that they rather agree or fully agree that the reason for 
being an adviser is in order to contribute to politics and policy making at a senior level (Table 3). It 
is important here to note that 46.3% of advisers appear to have been offered the job by chance and 
only 32% to have had a prior relationship with the minister which played a role in their deciding to 
become advisers. Moreover, a quarter of advisers seem to view their entering the Cabinet as a step 
towards future involvement in politics. Finally, from the five persons who stated other reasons for 
becoming an adviser, two have linked their decision to taking a step towards future employment in 
public affairs, policy making and education, while three have linked to “helping the minister whose 
integrity and sincerity I value the most” or “help Greece at difficult times”. 
 
Table 3 Why become an adviser? (%), n = 28 
 I totally 
disagree 
I rather 
disagree 
I rather agree I fully agree 
By chance, I was offered the 
opportunity and grabbed it 
7 (25%) 6 (21.4%) 8 (28.5%) 5 (17.8%) 
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To contribute to politics and policy 
making at a senior level  
1 (3.57%) 1 (3.57%) 7 (25%) 18 (64.2%) 
I come from a similar political 
background and I have a close personal 
relationship with the Minister 
8 (28.5%) 8 (28.5%) 8 (28.5%) 1 (3.57%) 
It’s a step towards a future 
involvement in politics 
11 (39.28%) 8 (28.5%) 6 (21.4%) 1 (3.57%) 
Other (please specify):   2 (7.1%) 3 (10.7%) 
*One did not answer and one gave half answers. 
 
5. Inside the cabinet: advisers and policy making 
In the following section we indulge into the details of advisers’ involvement in policy making. In 
particular, we attempt to classify advisers by policy role, policy advice activity based on the nature 
and dimension of advice, content of advice, and policy cycle stage. 
 
5.1 Policy expertise: generalists or specialists? 
According to Suleiman (1974) a typical ministerial staff unit comprises both specialists and 
generalists. The exact balance is thought to be dependent on the minister’s style and preferences 
(Connaughton 2010, p. 354). However, it may be argued that it is also institutional configurations 
that define this balance (James 2007, Schreurs et al. 2010). In ministerial cabinet systems we would 
expect to find a greater number of specialists in a wide array of fields related to various 
departmental portfolios. In our sample of ministerial advisers, specialists and generalists seem to be 
quite balanced, with specialists (15) marginally overtaking the generalists (13). 53.5% of advisers 
perceive themselves as specialists, as opposed to generalists comprising about 46.5%. The above 
results seem to marginally classify Greece in accordance with what one would expect to find in 
ministerial cabinet systems: prevalence of the type C “expert” adviser (Schreurs et al. 2010). As 
such it may be argued too that the dominant type of adviser in Greece, according to the OECD 
(2011, p. 11) three-category classification, is the expert. 
Having said this though, the real question in relation to policy making is how many qualified 
experts are there in fields related to a departmental portfolio? From the advisers who stated they are 
specialists the vast majority, 40%, stated that they specialise in a Ministry portfolio, 26.6% in Law, 
another 26.6% in Media and Communication, while 6.6% stated they specialise in generic public 
policy. Furthermore within the sample of specialists 33.3% answered that they specialise in a 
second field too, for example in a Ministry Portfolio, but also in Project Management. From those, 
one person appeared to specialise both in Law and a departmental portfolio. What the above results 
really tell us in relation to the real level of policy expertise is that within the whole sample of 28 
advisers, there are only 8 experts (28.57%) in some particular departmental policy related field. 
This of course is rather odd given responses emphasising the need for applied politics and policy 
skills. In order to get a clearer picture we need to examine what advisers actually do in greater 
detail.   
5.2 Policy making: what do advisers do? 
Job description 
We saw in section three, briefly, that advisers’ job descriptions, as these were assigned by the 
political executive, may be classified using functional, departmental and policy project criteria. 
Analysing job descriptions further, based on advisers’ open statements about the job assigned to 
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them by the Minister, we observe that the grand majority, 60.7%, appear to be involved in policy 
projects, like setting up the “One Stop Shop Business Facility”, “Enhancing Liquidity to SME’s”, 
“Accelerating Absorption of NSRF funds”, “Monitoring the Implementation of the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between the Ministry and the Troica”. Following this, 21.4% responded they 
do Communication and Media, 10.7% Law, while 3.57% are involved in both policy and law. 
However, in order to get a more precise picture of what Greek ministerial do we need to move 
beyond job descriptions into the actual reality.  
Primary job functions 
A first step is to analyse advisers’ primary job functions. According to the data in hand 71.4% of the 
respondents appear to share as their primary job function the management of policy projects 
codified as “managing projects and project management”. Following this, 42.8% are involved in 
formulating policy measures, 39.2% provide strategic advice, 35.7% advice on political 
considerations, 32.1% coordinate relations with stakeholders, while an equally high percentage 
appears to manage and administrate civil servants. Finally, 28.5% of the respondents appear to 
share communication and media as their primary job function. According to this observation, it may 
be argued that what Greek ministerial advisers do ranges from management and coordination to the 
nuts and bolts of policy, to strategy and communication. However, the impressive finding here is 
that the vast majority of advisers “manage projects” as their primary job function. This is closely 
associated to advisers’ job description we saw above.   
Table 4: Advisers’ primary job functions (%), n = 28 
Job Function No + (%) 
Giving Strategic Advice 
 
11 (39.2%) 
Coordinating Relations with Stakeholders  
 
9 (32.1%) 
Advising on Political Considerations  
 
10 (35.57%) 
Providing Media and Communication Advice  
 
8 (28.5%) 
Formulating Policy Measures  12 (42.8%) 
Managing Projects 
 
20 (71.4%) 
Managing Civil Servants 
 
9 (32.1%) 
No answer 
 
1 (3.57%) 
 
Activities, tasks and their frequency 
In the research, beyond job descriptions and primary functions, advisers were also asked to explain 
how they spend their time according to types of broad activities and specific tasks performed. In 
table 5 below, we can see the frequency of time spend in four major categories of activities: policy 
technicalities (drafting or processing laws, researching, formulating solutions etc), coordination and 
management (of policy work, the Cabinet staff, civil servants), politics (Party, MPs, Minister’s 
electoral district, networking) and communication with the media.  
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Table 5: Frequency of activities undertaken by advisers (%), n = 28 
Activities Never A couple of 
times per 
year 
Once a 
month 
Once a 
week 
Every day 
Policy Technicalities 6 (21.4%) 2 (7.1%) 1 (3.57%) 5 (17.8%) 10 (35.7%) 
Coordination and 
Management 
2 (7.1%) 2 (7.1%) 1 (3.57) 6 (21.4%) 14 (50%) 
Politics 
(Party, MPs, 
Minister’s electoral 
district, Networking) 
7 (25%) 7 (25%) 4 (14.3%) 5 (17.8%) 2 (7.1%) 
Media and 
Communication 
5 (17.8%) 6 (21.4%)  3 (10.7%) 3 (10.7%) 9 (32.1%) 
 
What is evident from the responses is how little time Greek ministerial advisers seem to spend in 
overt political activities (7.1%) and how much time they dedicate in coordination and management 
(50%) followed by policy technicalities (35.7%). This observation is consistent with both advisers’ 
job description and primary job function. However, it seems at odds with responses, according to 
which 35.7% provide advice on political considerations as their primary job function. How can one 
perform a primary job function so rarely? We may at this point suggest an explanation. “Advice on 
political considerations” is rightly understood by the advisers in our sample as political advice 
related to the public interest aspects of policy making. On the contrary, politics in the above 
mentioned question refers to party politics and the political executive’s electoral fortune, which in 
this respect relates to partisan politics. As we already pointed, in Greece, overt political work of the 
partisan type, for example elections, maintaining support for the Minister and relations with the 
party, is mainly outsourced to the political-electoral office (Vouleftiko Grafeio) that the Minister 
maintains as a Member of Parliament.  
Moving now from broad activities to specific tasks, it is evident from advisers’ responses that they 
do not perform partisan tasks. The vast majority, 67.8%, never or rarely maintain relations with the 
electoral district of the minister. An impressive 85.7% does not maintain relations with the 
grassroots support of the minister. This is in stark contrast to what Connaughton (2010, p. 359) 
found for the Irish advisers, where 79% of respondents answered that they very frequently or 
frequently assist their minister with electoral activities. However, it is closer to what Eichbaum and 
Shaw (2007, p. 99) found for advisers in New Zealand, where 50% of advisers in their sample 
responded that they never or rarely assist their minister with electoral issues. This detachment of 
Greek ministerial advisers from overt partisan political activities is further supported by an 
impressive 78.57% of respondents stating that they never or rarely meet with party officials. So, if 
Greek ministerial advisers do not get involved in such overt partisan political tasks, what is it 
exactly that they do then? More importantly is their work at all political or are they just a cluster of 
experts substituting the civil service?  
According to the data in hand, Greek ministerial advisers appear to be mainly focused on 
coordination and management tasks, as well as the nuts and bolts of policy making within their 
department. As Connaughton (2010, p. 358) argues “these are tasks that the ministers would do 
themselves if they had the time or would not be inclined to delegate to an apolitical civil servant”. 
On the coordination and management side advisers appear to frequently and very frequently ask 
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officials to provide memos or advice, attend meetings with civil servants and departmental officials, 
convey or clarify the minister’s wishes, meet advisers from other ministerial cabinets. While their 
vertical, within the ministry, coordination activity appears to be strong, their horizontal activity 
across ministries, government departments and political institutions appears to be rather weak. 
Liaising with MPs and party members is something that never or rarely happens. On the pure policy 
side advisers appear to analyse and evaluate implemented policy, read and comment on 
departmental advice, prepare policy files and memos, monitor the implementation of policy, 
produce evidence and facts in support of policy making.  
 
Table 6: Tasks undertaken by Greek ministerial advisers and their frequency (%), n= 28  
Tasks Never Rarely Occasionall
y 
 
Frequently  
 
Very 
frequently 
 
Ask officials to provide memos or 
advice  
0 (0%) 1 
(3.57%) 
7 (25%) 13 
(46.4%) 
6 (21.4%) 
Assist with budgetary matters  14 (50%) 6 
(21.4%) 
4 (14.2%) 2 (7.1%) 0 (0%) 
Attend meetings with civil servants 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 8 (28.57%) 12 
(42.8%) 
7 (25%) 
Broker meetings with interest groups   4 
(14.2%) 
5 
(17.8%) 
10 (35.7%) 4 (14.2%) 4 (14.2%) 
Convey or clarify Minister’s wishes 1 
(3.57%) 
0 (0%) 10 (35.7%) 10 
(35.7%) 
6 (21.4%) 
Maintain relations with the electoral 
district of the minister 
12 
(42.8%) 
7 (25%) 5 (17.8%) 3 (10.7%) 0 (0%) 
Meet with MPs  11 
(39.2%) 
7 (25%) 6 (21.4%) 2 (7.1%) 1 (3.57%) 
Meet with Party officials 14 (50%) 8 
(28.57%) 
3 (10.7%) 3 (10.7%) 0 (0%) 
Analyse and Evaluate implemented 
Policy 
4 
(14.2%) 
5 
(17.8%) 
3 (10.7%) 13 
(46.4%) 
1 (3.57%) 
Meet advisers from other ministerial 
cabinets 
0% 1 
(3.57%) 
5 (17.8%) 15 
(53.35%) 
6 (21.4%) 
Meet with departmental officials 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 5 (17.8%) 12 
(42.8%) 
10 (35.7%) 
Write press statements 7 (25%) 5 
(17.8%) 
4 (14.2%) 6 (21.4%) 3 (10.7%) 
Raise new policy initiatives with 
Minister 
5 
(17.8%) 
7 (25%) 6 (21.4%) 6 (21.4%) 2 (7.1%) 
Read & comment on official 
departmental advice 
2 (7.1%) 4 
(14.2%) 
3 (10.7%) 13 
(46.4%) 
5 (17.8%) 
Represent minister at departmental 
meetings 
5 
(17.8%) 
7 (25%) 7 (25%) 6 (21.4%) 3 (10.7%) 
Write speeches 12 
(42.8%) 
5 
(17.8%) 
4 (14.2%) 4 (14.2%) 2 (7.1%) 
Receive external delegations on the 
minister’s behalf 
5 
(17.8%) 
8 
(28.57%) 
8 (28.57%) 3 (10.7%) 3 (10.7%) 
Prepare policy files and memos 8 
(28.57%) 
2 (7.1%) 5 (17.8%) 8 
(28.57%) 
4 (14.2%) 
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Monitor the implementation of policy 8 
(28.57%) 
6 
(21.4%) 
4 (14.2%) 8 
(28.57%) 
2 (7.1%) 
Maintain relations with the grassroots 
support of the minister 
14 (50%) 10 
(35.7%) 
3 (10.7%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Produce evidence and facts in support 
of policy making 
7 (25%) 6 
(21.4%) 
2 (7.1%) 9 (32.1%) 3 (10.7%) 
Other (please specify) 
 
    1 (3.57%) 
Support 
Departments 
do their 
work 
 
5.3 A classification of policy advisory roles 
Based on data on advisers’ profiles, job descriptions, primary job functions, frequency of tasks and 
main activities performed, we will now classify Greek ministerial advisers according to policy 
advisory roles. As we have seen in our theoretical chapter, Connaughton (2010) suggests four types 
of advisers: the expert, the partisan, the coordinator and the minder. These role perceptions are 
constructed based on advisers’ profiles, as well as along two axes involving “policy making” and 
“communication” roles. The former role relates to substantive policy formulation and 
implementation activities, ranging from technical policy advice to policy steering. The latter role 
refers to procedural “communications” functions ranging from technical/managerial to political 
(Craft 2011, p. 89).       
We have seen above that while the majority of Greek ministerial advisers perceive themselves as 
specialists, in reality as far as policy making is concerned they are largely generalists who specialise 
in coordination and management of policy projects and to a second degree are involved in policy 
technicalities.  
Having established their general profile, we will now move to locate advisers by “policy making” 
and “communication” roles. Starting with “communication” roles, based on advisers’ responses, we 
may argue that they perform both technical/management and political tasks. On one side advisers 
appear to frequently and very frequently ask officials to provide memos or advice, attend meetings 
with civil servants and departmental officials, on the other they convey or clarify the minister’s 
wishes and meet advisers from other ministerial cabinets.  
Moving now to the “policy formulation and implementation” dimension, we see that our sample’s 
advisers are more focused on the steering side of the continuum rather than on the technical policy 
advice side. The Greek ministerial adviser is more of a “fixer” that mends, monitors policy and 
intervenes (Connaughton 2010, p. 365). This is supported by various data: a) the very few numbers 
of specialists dealing with policy issues related to departmental portfolios, b) the fact that 71.4% of 
advisers state “managing projects” as their primary job function at the ministry, c) the same 
percentage (71.4%) stating that they frequently or very frequently perform “project management” 
activities, d) the majority of advisers (64.2%) who frequently and very frequently focus attention on 
reading and commenting on official departmental advice.    
It is evident from the above that the Greek ministerial adviser fits best to the coordinator type, 
whose role includes the monitoring of the ministry’s program, as well as the steering of the policy 
process. This coordinator policy advisory role is also confirmed by data from our interviews. 
The political executive’s needs and attention appear to be mainly focused on policy management 
rather than on the actual design and formulation of the policy itself. According to Minister B:  
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 “I want advisers to monitor the development of policy in a particular field. I want them to provide 
input and then monitor the evolution of policy. Ideally they should be able to formulate policy too, 
but in this, the role they can play here depends on their individual capabilities and knowledge” 
[Own translation] 
 
Minister A gave a blunter view on the issue: 
 
“The adviser is a gear, a timing belt in the government machine. His basic function is policy 
acceleration, monitoring and supervision. He is neither an agenda setter, nor a policy formulator”. 
[Own translation] 
 
This policy management function has sprung up in one of our interviews with top civil servants. 
According to respondent 3:  
 
“Advisers are involved in the implementation of policy too. Whereby implementation means 
supervision, timeline, project management, monitoring of deadlines”. [Own translation] 
 
5.4 A classification of policy advice activity 
Following the suggestion of Craft (2011, p. 14), “a further step towards greater specificity” may be 
taken by examining the nature of advisers’ offered policy advice along substantive (administrative-
partisan) and procedural (vertical – horizontal) lines. Using again the same data as above, we may 
argue that the nature of advice offered by Greek ministerial advisers is of the administrative 
(substantive dimension) since Greek ministerial advisers appear not be involved in any significant 
overt political partisan activities, given that these are mainly the task of the Ministers’ Vouleftiko 
Grafeio. However, this is a classification base on what Greek ministerial advisers are not, rather 
than on what they are.  The data in hand tells us that they are predominantly focused on policy 
projects, managing these projects, performing project management and policy steering tasks. This 
angle in the nature of advice is not captured here. 
Moving now to the dimension of policy advice, based again on the same data, we may argue that 
Greek ministerial advisers work mainly along a vertical dimension, since advice giving focuses 
more on interdepartmental command and control type of activities, rather than those of a horizontal 
steering nature. Not disregarding the fact that 74.75% of advisers appear to meet very frequently or 
frequently with their colleagues from other ministries, the matter of fact is that 64.2% of advisers 
claim to never or rarely liaise with Members of Parliament, only 28.4% of the respondents appear to 
very frequently and frequently broker meetings with interest groups, while 78.57% never or rarely 
meets with party officials.  
Based on these observations we may claim that the Greek ministerial adviser is classified as the 
Administrative-Vertical type. This however, a classification we need to be wary about since it does 
not capture what the Greek adviser’s policy advice activity is, but rather what it is not. It is not 
partisan and definitely not horizontal. To argue that as a result Greek ministerial adviser’s policy 
advice activity is technical and fully vertical is not supported by the data in hand either. However, it 
may be argued that using Craft’s (2011) early attempt at classification of policy advice activities we 
did illuminate further two things: a) first the non technical nature of Greek ministerial adviser’s 
policy advice giving activities, b) most importantly the dimension of advisers’ policy activity, 
which is vertical with certain horizontal elements as far as coordination with advisers’ counterparts 
is concerned. 
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Figure 1: Classification of Greek ministerial advisers policy advice activity according to nature 
and dimension of advice  
Procedural 
(dimension of policy advice 
activity) 
 
 
 
 
HORIZONTAL 
 
 
VERTICAL 
Substantive 
Nature of policy advice contribution 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE                   PARTISAN 
 
Type I 
Administrative – Horizontal 
 
Type II 
Partisan – Horizontal 
GR  
Type III 
Administrative – Vertical 
 
Type IV 
Partisan Vertical 
Source: Craft (2011, p.16) 
5.5 A classification according to content of advice 
We may now proceed to classify Greek ministerial advisers according to the content of advice they 
provide within the broader policy advisory system. In order to locate advisers by content of advice, 
new data, beyond the ones used for the substantive/procedural based typologies above is needed. 
For this reason, advisers were asked to express their opinion on what they thought the content of 
advice provided by their colleagues was. The initial results are presented in table 7.   
Table 7: Greek ministerial advisers’ content of advice (%), n = 28 
 Not at all Very little Quite strongly Strongly 
1. Information-based 0 (0%) 1 (3.57%) 14 (50%) 11 (39.2%) 
2. Based on fragmented  
information, gossip 
5 (17.8%) 9 (32.1%) 11 (39.2%) 1 (3.57%) 
3. Based on Scientific 
Research  
0 (0%) 10 (35.7%) 8 (28.57%) 9 (32.1%) 
4. Based on opinion and 
ideology 
0 (0%) 4 (14.2%) 17 (60.7%) 5 (17.8%) 
5. Independent, neutral and 
problem solving 
1 (3.57%) 8 (28.57%) 15 (53.57%) 2 (7.1%) 
6. Partisan/ about winning 0 (0%) 3 (10.7%) 15 (53.57%) 8 (28.57%) 
7. Long-term 1 (3.57%) 10 (35.7%) 13 (46.4%) 2 (7.1%) 
8. Short-term 0 (0%) 6 (21.4%) 15 (53.57%) 5 (17.8%) 
9. Proactive and anticipatory 3 (10.7%) 16 (57.1%) 7 (25%) 0 (0%) 
10. Reactive/crisis driven 0 (0%) 2 (7.1%) 15 (53.57%) 9 (32.1%) 
11. Strategic and wide 
range/systematic 
1 (3.57%) 12 (42.8%) 10 (35.7%) 3 (10.7%) 
12. Single issue 0 (0%) 9 (32.1%) 14 (50%) 3 (10.7%) 
13. Pragmatic 0 (0%) 3 (10.7%) 19 (67.8%) 3 (10.7%) 
14. Idealistic 2 (7.1%) 13 (46.4%) 9 (32.1%) 1 (3.57%) 
15. Public interest focus 1 (3.57%) 2 (7.1%) 18 (64.28%) 5 (17.8%) 
16. Electoral gain oriented 0 (0%) 7 (25%) 15 (53.57%) 4 (14.2%) 
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17. Open processes 2 (7.1%) 11 (39.28%) 13 (46.4%) 0 (0%) 
18. Secret/deal making 2 (7.1%) 13 (46.4%) 10 (35.7%) 1 (3.57%) 
19. Objective clarity 1 (3.57%) 7 (25%) 18 (64.2%) 1 (3.57%) 
20. Ambiguity/overlapping 0 (0%) 8 (28.57%) 18 (64.2%) 0 (0%) 
21. Seek/propose best solution 0 (0%) 3 (10.7%) 18 (64.2%) 5 (17.8%) 
22. Consensus solution 1 (3.57%) 3 (10.7%) 17 (60.7%) 5 (17.8%) 
 
There are two ways of reading Table 7. First, for every item above we may measure agreement and 
disagreement. This is a very shallow way of getting results on content of advice and we will not 
attempt it. Second, we may read it in contrasting pairs where the odd numbers refer to elements of 
“cold”, long-term and anticipatory advice, and the even ones to “hot” short-term reactive advice. 
Based on this second way of looking at our data we produced table 8.  
Table 8: Greek ministerial advisers “hot” vs “cold” advice (%), n = 28 
Cold Advice Q. Strongly/ 
Strongly 
Hot Advice Q. Strongly / 
Strongly 
Information-based 25 (89.2%) Based on fragmented 
information, gossip 
13 (42.8%) 
Based on Scientific 
Research 
17 (60.7%) Based on opinion and 
ideology 
22 (78.5%) 
Independent, neutral and 
problem solving 
17 (60.7%) Partisan/ about winning 23 (82.1%) 
Long-term 15 (53.6%) Short-term 20 (71.4%) 
Proactive and 
anticipatory 
7 (25%) Reactive/crisis driven 24 (85.7%) 
Strategic and wide 
range/systematic 
13 (46.4%) Single issue 17 (60.7%) 
Pragmatic 22 (78.5%) Idealistic 10 (35.7%) 
Public interest focus 23 (82.1%) Electoral gain oriented 19 (67.8%) 
Open processes 13 (46.4%) Secret/deal making 11 (39.2%) 
Objective clarity 19 (67.8%) Ambiguity/overlapping 18 (64.2%) 
Seek/propose best 
solution 
23 (78.5%) Consensus solution 22 (78.5%) 
According to the data presented in table 8 the content of advice, which the advisers of our sample 
quite strongly or strongly agree that their peers are giving, is predominantly information-based, 
based on opinion and ideology, partisan about winning, short-term, reactive and crisis driven, single 
issue, pragmatic and with a focus on the public interest. As far the remaining characteristics are 
concerned the differences are very marginal for us to be able to claim a clear direction. However, 
we may argue that as far as those characteristics are concerned the content of advice leans 
marginally towards open processes, objectiveness and clarity, as well as searching for the best 
solutions. Overall, it may be argued that what we see here is a content of advice, which while 
marginally focused towards a long-term and anticipatory direction (pragmatic, public interest focus, 
open processes, clarity and best solutions) its real basis relies on short-term reactive elements 
(opinion and ideology, partisan, short-term, reactive and crisis driven, single issues). Thus, we may 
argue that the advice offered by the advisers in our sample, though dressed in “cold” clothes has in 
reality a “hot” content. In view of this, we may now position Greek ministerial advisers as 
providing predominantly two types of advice content: “pure” political and policy process advice, as 
far as the dimension of advice is concerned, and short term crisis and fire-fighting advice, as far as 
the nature of advice is concerned.  
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5.5 Advisers and the policy cycle 
Finally, we attempt to link advisers’ activities to the content of the discrete stages of the policy 
cycle. As we have argued in our theoretical chapter, this will allow us to achieve a more systematic 
interpretation of advisers’ policy activity. In view of this, advisers were asked to locate the exact 
policy cycle stage where they thought their activities in the ministerial cabinet are most important. 
Their responses are summarised in table 9. 
Table 9: Greek advisers roles in the policy cycle according to importance (%), n = 28 
Policy Cycle Stage Least 
Important 
Not very 
Important 
 
Important 
 
Most important 
Recognizing problems - 
setting agenda priorities  
0 (0%)  6 (21.4%) 17(60.7%) 4 (14.2%) 
Proposing Solutions and 
formulating policies 
0 (0%) 6 (21.4%) 14 (50%) 6 (21.4%) 
Deciding on the preferred 
course of action  
2 (7.1%) 13 
(46.4%) 
8 (28.5%) 2 (7.1%) 
Putting solutions into effect 1 (3.57%) 8 (28.5%) 9 (32.1%) 8 (28.5%) 
Monitoring results  4 (14.2%) 7 (25%) 9 (32.1%) 6 (21.4%) 
Note: 2 respondents answered half of the table, while one did not answer at all 
 
What we see here is that Greek ministerial advisers’ work is most important in the front end of 
policymaking. The above results confirm Sotiropoulos’ (2007, p. 22) observation that ministerial 
advisers in Greece enjoy extensive political leverage to set agendas and formulate policies. Indeed 
74.9% consider their role in recognition of problems and agenda setting as important and very 
important. In addition, an equally impressive 71.4% consider their role in proposing solutions and 
formulating policies as important or very important. As we would expect, advisers’ role appears as 
least important and not very important in deciding on the preferred course of action (53.5%). As 
Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (Howlett et al. 2009, p. 12) argue, when a decision is taken on one or 
more options, the number of actors is reduced to “only the subset of the policy subsystem composed 
of authoritative government decision makers”. Moreover, “unlike office-holders [ministers, deputy 
ministers, general secretaries], those other actors have, at best, voice in the decision-making 
process, not a vote” (Howlett et al. 2009, p. 140). Finally, as we would expect the “policy hour 
glass” opens up again as we move to the back end of policy making: policy implementation and 
policy evaluation (Howlett et al 2009, p. 12). It may be argued that the opening might be considered 
bigger than expected. The literature seems to deny advisers a significant role on policy 
implementation and evaluation (Craft 2011, p. 14). However, according to the responses of the 
advisers in our sample 60.6% appear to have an important or very important role in putting 
solutions into effect, while 53.5% seem to play an important or very important role in monitoring 
results. The above results show that Greek ministerial advisers are heavily involved in all stages of 
the policy cycle, except for the decision making process. This reflects the fact that ministerial 
cabinets have found to exercise a central role in the “design, formulation, implementation and 
evaluation of public policy” (James 2007, p. 17). It may be argued though that it also reflects the 
profile of our sample’s advisers as coordinators and policy project managers.   
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Conclusion 
In the present study we investigated the phenomenon of Greek ministerial advisers in the policy 
making process. Our fundamental research question was the following: what is the nature and role, 
particularly the policy making role, of the Greek ministerial adviser?  The study has tried to answer 
the question by classifying Greek ministerial advisers’ policy work according to policy advisory 
roles, policy advice activities based on nature and dimension of advice, content of advice, and the 
policy cycle, all through the use of relevant existing typologies.  
 
Starting with a sketch of the Greek politico-administrative context we saw that advisers in Greece 
belong to ministerial cabinets. As such, the phenomenon of Greek ministerial advisers shares 
important common characteristics with other OECD countries, but also projects fundamental 
differences. As in most OECD countries, in Greece too advisers’ appointment is at the sole 
discretion of the minister, their job description is not statutorily defined, their employment 
framework is streamlined to that of the civil service, their activity is perceived as beneficial in that 
they accelerate the policy process and improve the responsiveness of government, the working 
boundaries with the civil service are blurred, while finally they may also be a source of public 
concern. Belonging to a ministerial cabinet, though, accounts for certain fundamental differences. 
To begin with, advisers’ status, qualifications, employment framework and to a broader extend roles 
are strongly grounded in law. Greece belongs to the group of countries that define advisers in their 
regulations in terms of special advisers, a specific category of ministerial cabinet staff that unlike 
most of their colleagues is appointed to a special position, gets paid at the highest possible pay scale 
and is directly liable to the Minister. This however, does not mean that it is only they who perform 
advisory duties, nor is it to say that job descriptions, roles and activities in the Cabinet are legally 
predetermined. Apart from special advisers, members of the ministerial cabinet, like “special 
associates”, “scientific associates”, “fixed-term administrative employees” and “seconded civil 
servants”, may also be considered advisers so long as they perform “advisory” and not 
“administrative support” duties. This de facto division between “advisory” and “administrative 
support” staff is fundamental for understanding who has the status of an adviser in a Greek 
ministerial cabinet.  Second, advisers are numerous since ministerial cabinets are composed of a 
mixture of civil servants and external political appointees and run by a Chief of Cabinet, while they 
also have a varying size and synthesis based on the specific needs of every minister. Third, as in 
most ministerial cabinet systems, the use of advisers is linked to an increased need for political 
control, as well as a perception of civil service inadequacy. Fourth, Greek ministerial advisers form 
a “mini administration”, which apart from advice, also attempts to manage the civil service and this 
may be a source a constant friction among members of the Cabinet and civil servants. As interviews 
with senior civil servants have shown, Greek ministerial advisers’ beneficial role is also associated 
with important limitations. Like in most ministerial cabinet systems advisers receive criticism for 
belonging in a “closed circuit spoils system” (James 2007, p.18). In addition, they are perceived as 
gatekeepers of the ministerial office, thus preventing direct access to the minister. Finally, instead 
of shielding senior civil servants from political involvement, they are perceived as increasing 
politicisation (OECD 2011, p.19-20).  
 
But who are the Greek ministerial advisers? Our research has shown, that the Greek ministerial 
adviser appears to be predominantly male, in his thirties, with a postgraduate level of education who 
wants to contribute to politics and policy making at a senior level, and considers applied politics 
and policy skills to be the most important trait an adviser should possess in order to be able to 
perform his duty properly. Male dominance is a characteristic of also Ireland and New Zealand for 
which we have access to comparable data (Connaughton 2010, Eichbaum and Shaw 2007). In terms 
of field of education and professional background, we saw that advisers form a rather mixed group 
of people. Advisers with an educational background in law and politics, marginally more numerous, 
mingle with those with a background in communication and to a lesser extent economics and 
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business. Finally, we have argued that, in Greece, we might be observing the development of a 
political adviser profession, as is also the case with other ministerial cabinet systems (James 2007, 
p.11). 
 
Moving to the details of their policy making contribution, our research has shown that the majority 
of Greek ministerial advisers perceive themselves as specialists. This is consistent with the type of 
adviser profile we would expect to find in a ministerial cabinet system (Schreurs et al. 2010). 
However, the specialists dealing with specific departmental policy portfolios make up a minority in 
comparison to the generalists doing policy work, even when we add the legal specialists, 
traditionally found in ministerial cabinet systems. But what do these advisers do? Applying 
Connaughton’s (2010), Craft’s (2011), Craft and Howlett’s (2012) typologies, as well as the policy 
cycle approach on our data, we found that the Greek ministerial adviser:   
 
a) Belongs to the “Coordinator” type. He is predominantly a generalist with a main focus on 
management of the government program. This project management aspect of the Greek ministerial 
adviser’s job is a significant finding. First, it shows that Greek ministerial advisers do not fall within 
the traditional partisan political adviser category. It is not elections and the minister’s constituency 
they most deal with, since this is dealt by the political executive’s office as an MP (Vouleftiko 
Grafeio). Second, despite predominantly dealing with policy projects and while they seem to be 
involved to a great extent with policy technicalities, they are not the technical experts that we would 
expect to dominate in a traditional Cabinet system. One explanation for this is related to the 
personal styles of the two Ministers under examination, who give great emphasis to acceleration, 
management, coordination and an understanding of policy as made of single projects that need to be 
designed and implemented as such. Another might be the simple reality that policy making in 
Greece is highly political, with reform time always trying to catch up to political time, therefore 
characterised by a lack of technical, rational and evidence based policy making activities while in 
constant need for immediate swift action and results. We may argue that the literature on the role of 
experts in policy making in Greece lends some support to this explanation (Monastiriotis 2009, Ladi 
2005, 2007, Spanou 2008, p. 163).  
      
b) Performs policy advisory activity of the “Administrative-Vertical” type. According to the 
data in hand the Greek ministerial adviser seems definitely not partisan in the sense of party politics 
and narrow electoral gain orientation, while he is definitely not horizontal in a “governance” sort of 
way. However, despite the merits of this early theoretical attempt at classification, in the case of 
Greek ministerial adviser it does not illuminate two important traits of the phenomenon. In terms of 
nature of advice (substantive dimension) the Greek ministerial adviser is more focused on policy 
management and not technical/rational or evidence based as the typology suggests. This is better 
captured by Connaughton’s (2010) coordinator type. Moreover, in terms of dimension of advice 
(procedural dimension), our data shows that the Greek ministerial adviser, as James (2007, p.17) 
has shown to be the case with advisers in ministerial cabinet systems, has a frequent 
interdepartmental coordination role activity mainly with other ministerial advisers. This crucial 
horizontal element is not captured in the typology, since the Greek ministerial adviser appears to 
work in a silo when it comes to liaising with other MPs, party members and meeting interest 
groups. It may be argued that this again is a significant finding, which points to the need to further 
test the project manager hypothesis.  
 
c) Offers “hot” policy advice, dressed in “cold” clothes. Despite the offered policy advice being 
focused towards a long-term and anticipatory direction (pragmatic, public interest focus, open 
processes, clarity and best solutions) its real basis relies on short-term reactive elements (opinion 
and ideology, partisan-political, short-term, reactive and crisis driven, single issues focused). In this 
respect Greek ministerial advisers are classified as providing predominantly two types of advice 
content: “pure” political and policy process advice and short term crisis fighting and fire-fighting 
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advice. This again is a significant finding in that it reveals how policy advice, on behalf of Greek 
ministerial advisers, becomes political without being overtly partisan.   
 
d) Deals predominantly with the front end of policymaking, agenda setting and policy 
formulation. This finding is consistent with the claim that Greek ministerial “advisers enjoy 
extensive political leverage to set agendas and formulate policies” (Sotiropoulos 2007, p. 22). As 
far as decision making is concerned Greek ministerial advisers might have a “voice”, but certainly 
not a “vote”, as popular discourse might take it to be the case (Howlett and Ramesh 2009, p.140). 
However, our research has also shown that Greek ministerial advisers are significantly involved in 
the back end of the policy making process, in particular implementation and policy evaluation. This 
reflects the reality of ministerial cabinets exercising a central role in the “design, formulation, 
implementation and evaluation of public policy” (James 2007, p.17). It may be argued that it also 
reflects the coordinator, project manager type of adviser that we found to be dominant in our 
sample. 
  
Finally, in view of the findings presented in the current research, we need to be careful before 
claiming that they may be generalised to the broader population of Greek ministerial advisers. 
Indications are strong that we have produced an adequately significant classification of advisers’ 
policy making activities, based on “policy advisory roles”, “nature and dimension of advice”, 
“content of advice” and “stage of involvement in the policy cycle”. At a first level, the existing 
empirical gap was closed. The Greek ministerial adviser appears to be working within a ministerial 
cabinet context with a twist towards a coordinator and project management role. As such we may 
argue that Greek ministerial advisers form a case of a case of agents active in a politicized advisory 
system, as found in ministerial cabinets. However, our results would need to be put to the test. In 
view of this we would like to offer the following leads for future research: a) in respect to the 
research design, add interviews with ministerial advisers specifically focused on the construction of 
typologies in order to get a deeper view of the data, b) in respect to theory, improve typologies 
along substantive-procedural lines so that the issue of coordination may come into the forefront, c) 
in respect to sample selection, empirically test our findings by running the survey into a different 
sample of ministerial advisers from the Ministry for Development or, even better, another civilian, 
non special corps organised Ministry. Finally, given that our investigation inside the Cabinet 
projects a lack of technical expertise in policy related issues it would be interesting to investigate 
where this expertise might be coming from, if at all, within the broader Greek policy advisory 
system? Of course this would entail the examination of the policy advisory system on specific 
policy fields. To conclude, on a more practical tone and if we may suggest a course of action to 
Greek ministerial advisers, this would be to become more active in the horizontal coordination of 
external sources of policy advice, whether these are found in academic, professional, interest group 
and civil society expertise or in political institutions such as the Parliament and political parties.   
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